# Security, in plain words

Phone access opens a way into the computer your agents run on. Here's how Pane keeps that way yours.

## The short version

- **Only your computer can read your traffic.** Your phone's connection is encrypted with standard TLS, the same encryption banks and every `https` site use. It's decrypted on your computer and nowhere else.
- **Pane's relays can't read it.** They pass the sealed connection along, like a mail carrier who reads the address but never opens the envelope.
- **Pairing is a narrow door.** Each QR code or link works once and expires.
- **Every device has its own token** (a long secret that proves it's allowed in). Remove one phone and your other phones keep theirs. A lost phone can lose access everywhere at once.
- **No new crypto.** Pane didn't invent its own encryption. Every piece that protects your traffic is something the web already trusts.

## Who can see what

| | Sees | Never sees |
|---|---|---|
| **Your computer** | Everything | |
| **Pane's relays** | Which computer a connection is for, IP addresses, timing, byte counts | What you type, what agents print, tokens, code, previews |
| **Pane, the company** | The same as the relays, because we run them | The same as the relays |
| **Your Wi-Fi or mobile carrier** | That you're connecting to a `runpane.net` address | Anything inside the connection |

The relays never see what's inside, so they can't log it. On a direct path, the packets are encrypted between your phone and your computer, and the relay only helps the two find each other. See [How it connects](/docs/how-it-connects).

## Pairing: the one door without a login

1. The QR code or link holds a random secret: 256 bits, more than anyone could ever guess.
2. The secret sits after the `#` in the link. Browsers and apps never send that part to a server, so it never reaches the relay.
3. It works once. A QR code expires after 10 minutes, a copied link after the time you pick: 10 minutes, 1 hour or 24 hours.
4. Your computer trades it for a token that belongs to that one device. It keeps only a scrambled copy (a hash) of the token, and checks it in a way that leaks no timing clues.
5. Five wrong secrets from one IP address within a minute lock that address out for 15 minutes. Other addresses can still pair.

Everything else on your computer needs a paired device's token. No token, no answer, on every path: same Wi-Fi, direct or relay.

## Your computer's key stays home

Your computer makes its own private key and its own certificate for its own address, `<id>.runpane.net`. The key never leaves the computer.

The Pane apps also remember each computer's key the first time they pair (this is called key pinning). That matters because we run `runpane.net`. Even if someone, us included, got a certificate for your computer's name, the Pane apps would refuse it, because the key wouldn't match. The browser app relies on the browser's own certificate checks, like any website.

This key check covers the relay, the direct path and the same Wi-Fi. Other routes between your computers use their own checks: Tailscale's device identity, SSH's host key, or your public URL's HTTPS certificate.

## Lose a phone? Remove it everywhere

On any of your computers, open **Settings → Remote Access → Phones and glasses**, find the phone and choose **Remove → Remove from all your computers**. It's signed out everywhere, and the links it made between your computers are undone ([details](/docs/your-computers#remove-a-phone-or-a-computer)), so a stolen phone can't leave a way back in.

## What we checked

Before launch, our own code reviews found and fixed issues, including ways to abuse the relay. In November 2026 we ran a security review that attacked the system from the outside, with no paired device. What held:

- Every route except pairing refused requests without a device token.
- Pairing codes were single use, expired on time, were rate limited and were compared safely.
- Removed devices and used codes were refused on every path.
- The port phones use on your Wi-Fi refused everything without a token.
- Port previews only ever reach your own computer (`localhost`), never another address.
- The browser app held up against cross-site attacks.

We fix what reviews find, and Pane is open source under AGPL-3.0, so you can read every line: [github.com/greenfield-inc/Pane](https://github.com/greenfield-inc/Pane). The relay is open source too.

## Want even less trust in us?

- [Run your own relay](/docs/self-hosted-relay) on a machine and domain you control. Pane connects there instead of our servers.
- Or skip relays entirely and [use Tailscale](/docs/remote-daemon).

## What Pane doesn't protect against

Anyone you pair can do what you can do on that computer: run agents and shell commands. So can every computer you link. Pair only phones you trust, link only computers you own, and remove the ones you don't use. Pane also doesn't sandbox agents. See [Security & permissions](/docs/security).

Found a problem? Email **khazapar7@gmail.com** and **tyler@tbrown.io**, not a public issue. See [Reporting a vulnerability](/docs/security#reporting-a-vulnerability).
